Nevada Landlord Tenant Law - Click here to return to US Landlord

State of Nevada Eviction Law


118A.060 "Cause" defined. A tenancy is terminated with "cause"
for:
1. Nonpayment of rent.
2. Nonpayment of utility charges if the landlord
customarily pays such charges and submits a separate bill to the
tenant.
3. Failure of the tenant to comply with:
(a) Basic obligations imposed on the tenant by this
chapter;
(b) Valid rules or regulations established pursuant to this chapter;
or
(c) Valid provisions of the rental agreement.
4. Condemnation of the dwelling unit.
(Added to NRS by 1977, 1331)


118A.420 Failure of tenant to comply with rental
agreement or perform basic obligations: Damages; injunctive relief. 
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the landlord
may recover damages and obtain injunctive relief for failure of the
tenant to comply with the rental agreement or perform his
basic obligations under this chapter.
(Added to NRS by 1977, 1341)

118A.430 Failure of tenant to comply with rental
agreement or perform basic obligations: Termination of rental
agreement.
1. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, if the
tenant fails to comply with the rental agreement or fails to
perform his basic obligations under this chapter, the
landlord may deliver a written notice to the tenant
specifying the acts and omissions constituting the breach and that
the rental agreement will terminate as provided in this section. If the
breach is remediable and the tenant does not adequately
remedy the breach or use his best efforts 
to remedy the breach within 5 days after receipt of the notice, or if
the breach cannot be remedied, the landlord may terminate
the rental agreement.
2. If the tenant is not reasonably able to remedy the
breach, the tenant may avoid termination of the rental
agreement by authorizing the landlord to enter and remedy
the breach and by paying any reasonable expenses or damages
resulting from the breach or the remedy thereof.
(Added to NRS by 1977, 1341)

118A.440 Failure of tenant to perform basic obligations:
Remedial work by landlord may be charged to
tenant. If the tenant's failure to perform 
basic obligations under this chapter can be remedied by repair,
replacement of a damaged item or cleaning, and the tenant
fails to use his best efforts to comply within 14 days after written
notice by the landlord specifying the breach and requesting
that the tenant remedy it within that period of time or more
promptly if conditions require in case of emergency, the
landlord may enter the dwelling unit and cause the work to
be done in a workmanlike manner and submit the itemized bill for
the actual and reasonable cost, or the fair and reasonable value of
the work. The itemized bill shall be paid as rent on the next date
periodic rent is due, or if the rental agreement has terminated, may
be submitted to the tenant for immediate payment or
deducted from the security.
(Added to NRS by 1977, 1341)

118A.480 Landlord's recovery of possession of dwelling
unit. The landlord shall not recover or take possession of
the dwelling unit by action or otherwise, including willful
diminution or interruption or causing or permitting the diminution
or interruption of any essential service required by the rental
agreement or this chapter, except:
1. By an action for possession or other civil action or summary
proceeding in which the issue of 
right of possession is determined;
2. When the tenant has surrendered possession of the
dwelling unit to the landlord; or
3. When the tenant has abandoned the dwelling unit as
provided in NRS 118A.450.
(Added to NRS by 1977, 1342)

118A.490 Actions based upon nonpayment of rent: Counterclaim
by tenant; deposit of rent with court; judgment for
eviction.
1. In an action for possession based upon nonpayment of rent or
in an action for rent where the 
tenant is in possession, the tenant may defend and
counterclaim for any amount which he may recover under the rental
agreement, this chapter, or other applicable law. If it appears that
there is money which may be due to the landlord by the
tenant after 
the day of the hearing or if a judgment is delayed for any reason,
the court shall require a tenant who remains in possession
of the premises to deposit with the court a just and reasonable
amount to satisfy the obligation, but not more than 1 day's rent for
each 
day until the new hearing date. The court shall order the
tenant to pay the landlord any rent which is not in
dispute and shall determine the amount due to each 
party. Upon the application of either party, the court, after notice
and opportunity for a hearing, may for good cause release to either
party all or any portion of the rent paid into court by the
tenant. The court shall award the prevailing party the
amount owed and shall give judgment for any other amount which
is due.
2. In any action for rent where the tenant is not in
possession, the tenant may counterclaim as provided in
subsection 1 but is not required to pay any rent into court.
3. When the court renders a decision on the landlord's
claim for possession, it shall distribute any rent paid into court
under subsection 1 upon a determination of the amount due to each
party.
4. If a tenant fails to deposit with the court within 24
hours after the original hearing the entire amount required pursuant
to subsection 1, the tenant relinquishes his right to a
hearing and the court shall at that time grant a judgment for
eviction without further hearing.
(Added to NRS by 1977, 1342; A 1985, 1419)



SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS FOR OBTAINING POSSES-
SION OF REAL PROPERTY, RECREATIONAL
VEHICLE OR MOBILE HOME

40.215 Definitions.
40.220 Entry to be made only when legal and in peaceable manner.
40.230 Forcible entry defined.
40.240 Forcible detainer defined.
40.250 Unlawful detainer: Possession after expiration of term.
40.251 Unlawful detainer: Possession of property leased for
indefinite time after notice to quit.
40.2512 Unlawful detainer: Possession after default in payment of
rent.
40.2514 Unlawful detainer: Assignment or subletting contrary to
lease; waste; unlawful business; nuisance; violations of controlled
substances laws.
40.2516 Unlawful detainer: Possession after failure to perform
conditions of lease; saving lease from forfeiture.
40.252 Unlawful detainer: Contractual provisions void if contrary
to specified periods of notice; notice to quit or surrender by
colessor is valid unless showing other colessors did not authorize
notice.
40.253 Unlawful detainer: Supplemental remedy of summary
eviction and exclusion of tenant for default in payment of
rent.
40.254 Unlawful detainer: Supplemental remedy of summary
eviction and exclusion of tenant from certain types of
property.
40.255 Removal of person holding over after 3-day notice to quit;
circumstances authorizing removal.
40.260 Tenant of agricultural lands may hold over if not
notified.
40.270 Tenant has similar remedies against subtenant.
40.280 Service of notices to quit; proof required before issuance of
order to remove.
40.290 Parties defendant; persons bound by judgment.
40.300 Contents of complaint; issuance and service of summons;
temporary writ of restitution; notice, hearing and bond.
40.310 Issue of fact to be tried by jury if proper demand made.
40.320 Proof required of plaintiff and defendant on trial.
40.330 Amendment of complaint to conform to proof;
continuance.
40.340 Adjournments.
40.350 Trial not to be adjourned when complainant admits
evidence in affidavit would be given.
40.360 Judgment; damages; execution and enforcement.
40.370 Verification of complaint and answer.
40.380 Provisions governing appeals.
40.390 Appellate court not to dismiss or quash proceedings for
want of form.
40.400 Rules of practice.
40.420 Form of writ of restitution; execution.
40.425 Notice of execution on writ of restitution.


40.215 Definitions. As used in NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive,
unless the context 
requires otherwise:
1. "Mobile home" means every vehicle, including equipment,
which is constructed, reconstructed or added to in such a way as to
have an enclosed room or addition occupied by one or more
persons as a dwelling or sleeping place and which has no
foundation other 
than wheels, jacks, skirting or other temporary support.
2. "Mobile home lot" means a portion of land within a mobile
home park which is rented or held out for rent to accommodate a
mobile home.
3. "Mobile home park" or "park" means an area or tract of land
where two or more mobile homes or mobile home lots are rented or
held out for rent. "Mobile home park" or "park" does not include
those areas or tracts of land, whether within or outside of a park, 
where the lots are held out for rent on a nightly basis.
4. "Premises" includes a mobile home.
5. "Recreational vehicle" means a vehicular structure primarily
designed as temporary living 
quarters for travel, recreational or camping use, which may be
self-propelled or mounted upon or drawn by a motor vehicle.
6. "Recreational vehicle lot" means a portion of land within a
recreational vehicle park, or a portion of land so designated within
a mobile home park, which is rented or held out for rent to
accommodate a recreational vehicle overnight or for less than 3
months.
7. "Recreational vehicle park" means an area or tract of land
where lots are rented or held out for rent to accommodate a
recreational vehicle overnight 
or for less than 3 months.
(Added to NRS by 1969, 264; A 1979, 1877; 1981, 2037; 1989,
1081)

40.220 Entry to be made only when legal and in peaceable
manner. No entry shall be made 
into any lands, tenements or other possessions but in cases where
entry is given by law; and in such cases, only in a peaceable manner,
not with strong hand nor with multitude of people.
[1911 CPA º 643; RL º 5585; NCL º 9132]

REVISER'S NOTE. "Case" was changed to "cases" to effect
agreement in the section. 

NEVADA CASES.
Summary proceedings in general open to objections. 
Summary proceedings are in general open to objections for
technical omissions and imperfections or defects in return. Paul v.
Armstrong, 1 Nev. 82 (1865)
Statute must be strictly pursued. Whenever statutory authority
exists by which man may be deprived of his property or estate,
statute must be strictly pursued. Paul v. Armstrong, 1 Nev. 82
(1865), cited, Gasser v. Jet Craft, Ltd., 87 Nev. 376, at 379, 487
P.2d 346 (1971)

Object not to try titles but preserve peace and prevent violence.
Object of B ºº 41 and 42 (cf. NRS 40.220 et seq.), relating to
actions for forcible entry and detainer, is not to try titles, but to
preserve peace and prevent violence. Lachman v. Barnett, 18 Nev.
269, 3 Pac. 38 (1884)

Complaint which did not allege fraud insufficient to warrant arrest
of defendant. Under secs. 1, 2 and 9, ch. 46, Stats. 1865 (cf. NRS
40.220-40.252, 40.254 and 40.300), relating to forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, complaint which did not allege fraud on part of
defendant, either in making such forcible entry or in holding such
possession by force, was radically defective and wholly insufficient
to warrant arrest of defendant under the statute. Strozzi v. Wines,
24 Nev. 389, 55 Pac. 828, 57 Pac. 832 (1899)

Cross-complaint demanding money judgment permitted. In action
of unlawful detainer of real 
property governed by NCL ºº 9132-9152 (cf. NRS 40.220 et seq.),
cross-complaint demanding 
money judgment is permitted in order that entire controversy
between parties may be determined in one action. West v. Edwards,
62 Nev. 1, 134 P.2d 932 (1943), cited, Volpert v. Papagna, 83
Nev. 429, at 434, 433 P.2d 533 (1967)

Provision for temporary writ of restitution intended to be
summary. Provisions of NCL º 9132 et seq. (cf. NRS 40.220 et
seq.) governing actions of forcible entry and detainer are often
summary in character, and provision of 1931 NCL º 9140 (cf. NRS
40.300) for temporary writ of restitution "upon application" was
likewise intended to be summary and did not contemplate notice of
application. Farnow v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 64 Nev. 109,
178 P.2d 371 (1947), 
distinguished, Whitney v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 68 Nev. 176,
at 180, 227 P.2d 960 (1951)

Procedure presumed to be complete in itself. In action of forcible
entry and detainer, remedy afforded by NCL º 9132 et seq. (cf.
NRS 40.220 et seq.) was unknown to common law, and procedure
was presumed to be complete in itself. To apply procedural
provisions of other statutes would have violated intent of legislature
and introduced confusion and uncertainty into future 
application of statute. Farnow v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 64
Nev. 109, 178 P.2d 371 (1947), cited, Beyer v. Second Judicial
Dist. Court, 67 Nev. 480, at 486, 221 P.2d 1024 (1950), Gibby's,
Inc. v. Aylett, 96 Nev. 678, at 681, 615 P.2d 949 (1980)

40.230 Forcible entry defined. Every person is guilty of a forcible
entry who either:
1. By breaking open doors, windows or other parts of a house, or
by fraud, intimidation or stealth, or by any kind of violence or
circumstance of terror, enters upon or into any real property; or
2. Who, after entering peaceably upon real property, turns out by
force, threats or menacing conduct, the party in natural possession.
[1911 CPA º 644; RL º 5586; NCL º 9133]

NEVADA CASES.
Object of action. Object of B ºº 41 and 42 (cf. NRS 40.220 et
seq.), relating to actions for forcible entry and detainer, is not to try
titles, but to preserve peace and prevent violence. Lachman v.
Barnett, 18 Nev. 269, 3 Pac. 38 (1884)

Complaint which did not allege fraud insufficient to warrant arrest
of defendant. Under secs. 1, 2 and 9, ch. 46, Stats. 1865 (cf. NRS
40.220-40.252, 40.254 and 40.300), relating to forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, complaint which did not allege fraud on part of
defendant, either in making such forcible entry or in holding such
possession by force, was radically defective and wholly 
insufficient to warrant arrest of defendant under the statute. Strozzi
v. Wines, 24 Nev. 389, 55 Pac. 828, 57 Pac. 832 (1899)


40.240 Forcible detainer defined. 
Every person is guilty of a forcible detainer who either:
1. By force, or by menaces or threats of violence, unlawfully
holds and keeps the possession of any real property, whether the
same was acquired peaceably or otherwise; or
2. Who, in the nighttime, or during the absence of the occupant of
any real property, unlawfully enters thereon, and who, after demand
made for the surrender thereof, refuses for a period of 3 days to
surrender the same to such former occupant. The occupant of real
property within the meaning of this subsection is one who, within 5
days preceding such unlawful entry, was in the peaceable and
undisturbed possession of such lands.
[1911 CPA º 645; RL º 5587; NCL º 9134]

NEVADA CASES.
Complaint which did not allege fraud insufficient to warrant arrest
of defendant. Under secs. 1, 2 and 9, ch. 46, Stats. 1865 (cf. NRS
40.220-40.252, 40.254 and 40.300), relating to forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, complaint which did not allege fraud on part of
defendant, either in making such forcible entry or in holding such
possession by force, was radically defective and wholly insufficient
to warrant arrest of defendant under the statute. Strozzi v. Wines,
24 Nev. 389, 55 Pac. 828, 57 Pac. 832 (1899)


40.250 Unlawful detainer: Possession after expiration of term. A
tenant of real property or a mobile home for a term less
than life is guilty of an unlawful detainer when he continues in
possession, in person or by subtenant, of the property or mobile
home or any part thereof, after the expiration of the term for which
it is let to him. In all cases where real property is leased for a
specified term or period, or by express or implied contract, whether
written or parol, the tenancy terminates without notice at the
expiration of the specified term or period.
[1911 CPA º 646; A 1917, 31; 1919 RL º 5588; NCL º
9135]--(NRS A 1969, 262, 574; 1973, 1084; 1977, 1344; 1979,
1877; 1985, 227)
NEVADA CASES.
Judgment upon confession. 
Judgment upon confession cannot be entered in justice's court in
action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer. Paul v. Armstrong,
1 Nev. 82 (1865)

Landlord and tenant relationship. Before
unlawful detainer action will lie, relation of landlord and
tenant must exist between parties. Paul v. Armstrong, 1 
Nev. 82 (1865), cited, Gasser v. Jet Craft, Ltd., 87 Nev. 376, at
379, 487 P.2d 346 (1971)

Holdover lessee became liable for stipulated rent for entire term
although premises were vacated before term expired. Under sec. 4,
ch. 81, Stats. 1865 (cf. NRS 40.250), which provided that when
lessee held over with consent of lessor and lease was for term of
less than 1 year, tenancy created was that designated in lease, where
term designated was 3 months and lessor had not relinquished his
right to rent, lessee became liable for stipulated rent for entire term,
although premises were vacated before term expired. Fitton v.
Inhabitants of Hamilton City, 6 Nev. 196 
(1870)

Complaint which did not allege fraud insufficient to warrant arrest
of defendant. Under secs. 1, 2 and 9, ch. 46, Stats. 1865 (cf. NRS
40.220-40.252, 40.254 and 40.300), relating to forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, complaint which did not allege fraud on part of
defendant, either in making such forcible entry or in holding such
possession by force, was radically defective and wholly insufficient
to warrant arrest of defendant under statute. Strozzi v. Wines, 24
Nev. 389, 55 Pac. 828, 57 Pac. 832 (1899)

Prima facie showing that landlord-tenant
relationship exists should not preclude defendant from showing
other facts. Purpose of unlawful detainer statute, RL º 5588 (cf.
NRS 40.250-40.252 and 40.254), is to afford summary remedy to
landlords where true 
relationship of landlord and tenant existed. Such
relationship is foundation of action, and prima facie showing that
relationship exists should not preclude defendant from 
showing other facts which would establish nonexistence of such
relationship. Yori v. Phenix, 38 
Nev. 277, 149 Pac. 180 (1915), cited, Volpert v. Papagna, 83 Nev.
429, at 434, 433 P.2d 533 
(1967)

Common law rule that title cannot be placed in issue in action for
forcible entry does not apply in action for unlawful detainer. Action
for unlawful detainer, as defined in RL º 5588 (cf. NRS
40.250-40.252 and 40.254), is designed to afford to
landlord summary remedy for recovery of leased premises
and was unknown to common law. It affords different remedy than
common law action of forcible detainer which is designed to keep
peace, and rule that title cannot be placed in issue in action for
common law forcible entry does not apply in action for unlawful 
detainer, which can be maintained only where landlord and
tenant relationship exists or existed. Yori v. Phenix, 38
Nev. 277, 149 Pac. 180 (1915), cited, Farnow v. Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court, 64 Nev. 109, at 121, 178 P.2d 371 (1947), Gibby's,
Inc. v. Aylett, 96 Nev. 678, at 680, 615 P.2d 949 (1980)

Defendant may introduce evidence that lease constituted
mortgage. Action for unlawful detainer, defined in RL º 5588 (cf.
NRS 40.250-40.252 and 40.254), can be maintained only where
landlord-tenant relationship exists or existed, and
defendant in such action should have been permitted to introduce
evidence showing that deed given by him to plaintiff, 
and lease given in return, did not create
landlord-tenant relationship but constituted
security transaction in connection with loan, and, pursuant to RL º
5518 (cf. NRS 
40.050), constituted mortgage which could be enforced only by
action of foreclosure as provided by RL º 5501 (cf. NRS 40.430).
Yori v. Phenix, 38 Nev. 277, 149 Pac. 180 (1915), cited, Hannig v.
Conger, 54 Nev. 388, at 394, 19 P.2d 769 (1933), Flyge v. Flynn,
63 Nev. 201, at 224, 166 P.2d 539 (1946), Volpert v. Papagna, 83
Nev. 429, at 434, 433 P.2d 533 (1967)

Complaint must show 
that detention of premises is 
unlawful within meaning of 
statute. One seeking 
summary relief in unlawful 
detainer action pursuant to sec. 
1, ch. 27, Stats. 1917 (cf. NRS 
40.250-40.252 and 40.254), must 
bring himself clearly within 
terms of detainer statute, and 
his complaint must show that 
detention of premises is 
unlawful within meaning of 
statute. Roberts v. Second 
Judicial Dist. Court, 43 Nev. 
332, 185 Pac. 1067 (1920), 
cited, Gasser v. Jet Craft, 
Ltd., 87 Nev. 376, at 380, 387 
P.2d 346 (1971)

Water rights may be 
subject of unlawful detainer. 
Water rights may be 
subject of unlawful detainer 
under RL º 5588 (cf. NRS 40.250-
40.252) because they are realty 
as to which relation of landlord 
and tenant may exist. Nenzel v. 
Rochester Silver Corp., 50 Nev. 
352, 259 Pac. 632 (1927), cited, 
In re Filippini, 66 Nev. 17, at 
22, 202 P.2d 535 (1949), Carson 
City v. Estate of Lompa, 88 Nev. 
541, at 542, 501 P.2d 662 (1972)


40.251 Unlawful detainer: Possession of 
property leased for indefinite time after notice to 
quit. A tenant of real property, a recreational 
vehicle or a mobile home for a term less than life is 
guilty of an unlawful detainer when having leased:
1. Real property, except as otherwise provided in 
this section, or a mobile home for an indefinite time, 
with monthly or other periodic rent reserved, he 
continues in possession thereof, in person or by 
subtenant, without the landlord's consent after the 
expiration of a notice of:
(a) For tenancies from week to week, at least 7 
days;
(b) For all other periodic tenancies, at least 30 
days; or
(c) For tenancies at will, at least 5 days.
2. A dwelling unit subject to the provisions of 
chapter 118A of NRS, he continues in possession, in 
person or by subtenant, without the landlord's consent 
after expiration of:
(a) The term of the rental agreement or its 
termination and, except as otherwise provided in 
paragraph (b), the expiration of a notice of at least 
7 days for tenancies from week to week and 30 days for 
all other periodic tenancies; or
(b) A notice of at least 5 days where the tenant has 
failed to perform his basic or contractual obligations 
under chapter 118A of NRS.
3. A mobile home lot subject to the provisions of 
chapter 118B of NRS, or a lot for a recreational 
vehicle in an area of a mobile home park other than an 
area designated as a recreational vehicle lot pursuant 
to the provisions of subsection 6 of NRS 40.215, he 
continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, 
without the landlord's consent, after notice has been 
given pursuant to NRS 118B.190 and the period of the 
notice has expired.
4. A recreational vehicle lot, he continues in 
possession, in person or by subtenant, without the 
landlord's consent, after the expiration of a notice 
of at least 5 days.
(Added to NRS by 1985, 226; A 1989, 1081)
NEVADA CASES.
Complaint which did not allege 
fraud insufficient to warrant 
arrest of defendant. Under 
secs. 1, 2 and 9, ch. 46, Stats. 
1865 (cf. NRS 40.220-40.252, 
40.254 and 40.300), relating to 
forcible entry and unlawful 
detainer, complaint which did 
not allege fraud on part of 
defendant, either in making such 
forcible entry or in holding 
such possession by force, was 
radically defective and wholly 
insufficient to warrant arrest 
of defendant under the statute. 
Strozzi v. Wines, 24 Nev. 389, 
55 Pac. 828, 57 Pac. 832 (1899)

Prima facie showing 
that landlord-tenant 
relationship exists should not 
preclude defendant from showing 
other facts. Purpose of 
unlawful detainer statute, RL º 
5588 (cf. NRS 40.250-40.252 and 
40.254), is to afford summary 
remedy to landlords where true 
relationship of landlord and 
tenant existed. Such 
relationship is foundation of 
action, and prima facie showing 
that relationship exists should 
not preclude defendant from 
showing other facts which would 
establish nonexistence of such 
relationship. Yori v. Phenix, 38 
Nev. 277, 149 Pac. 180 (1915), 
cited, Volpert v. Papagna, 83 
Nev. 429, at 434, 433 P.2d 533 
(1967)

Common law rule that 
title cannot be placed in issue 
in action for forcible entry 
does not apply to action for 
unlawful detainer. Action 
for unlawful detainer, as 
defined in RL º 5588 (cf. NRS 
40.250-40.252 and 40.254), is 
designed to afford to landlord 
summary remedy for recovery of 
leased premises and was unknown 
to common law. It affords 
different remedy than common law 
action of forcible detainer 
which is designed to keep peace, 
and rule that title cannot be 
placed in issue in action for 
common law forcible entry does 
not apply in action for unlawful 
detainer, which can be 
maintained only where landlord 
and tenant relationship exists 
or existed. Yori v. Phenix, 38 
Nev. 277, 149 Pac. 180 (1915), 
cited, Farnow v. Eighth Judicial 
Dist. Court, 64 Nev. 109, at 
121, 178 P.2d 371 (1947), 
Gibby's, Inc. v. Aylett, 96 Nev. 
678, at 680, 615 P.2d 949 (1980)

Defendant may introduce 
evidence that lease constituted 
mortgage. Action for 
unlawful detainer, defined in RL 
º 5588 (cf. NRS 40.250-40.252 
and 40.254), can be maintained 
only where landlord-tenant 
relationship exists or existed, 
and defendant in such action 
should have been permitted to 
introduce evidence showing that 
deed given by him to plaintiff, 
and lease given in return, did 
not create landlord-tenant 
relationship but constituted 
security transaction in 
connection with loan, and, 
pursuant to RL º 5518 (cf. NRS 
40.050), constituted mortgage 
which could be enforced only by 
action of foreclosure as 
provided by RL º 5501 (cf. NRS 
40.430). Yori v. Phenix, 38 Nev. 
277, 149 Pac. 180 (1915), cited, 
Hannig v. Conger, 54 Nev. 388, 
at 394, 19 P.2d 769 (1933), 
Flyge v. Flynn, 63 Nev. 201, at 
224, 166 P.2d 539 (1946), 
Volpert v. Papagna, 83 Nev. 429, 
at 434, 433 P.2d 533 (1967)

Complaint must show 
that detention of premises is 
unlawful within meaning of 
statute. One seeking 
summary relief in unlawful 
detainer action pursuant to sec. 
1, ch. 27, Stats. 1917 (cf. NRS 
40.250-40.252 and 40.254), must 
bring himself clearly within 
terms of detainer statute, and 
his complaint must show that 
detention of premises is 
unlawful within meaning of 
statute. Roberts v. Second 
Judicial Dist. Court, 43 Nev. 
332, 185 Pac. 1067 (1920), 
cited, Gasser v. Jet Craft, 
Ltd., 87 Nev. 376, at 380, 387 
P.2d 346 (1971)

Notice to quit must be 
specific and peremptory. 
To terminate month-to-
month tenancy so that detention 
thereafter will be unlawful 
pursuant to sec. 1, ch. 27, 
Stats. 1917 (cf. NRS 40.251), 
notice to quit must be specific 
and peremptory. Conditional or 
uncertain notice will not answer 
requirements of statute. Where 
notice stated that use of 
premises disturbed other tenants 
of building and that landlord 
could not continue to rent 
premises for such purpose, 
notice was not sufficient under 
statute. (See NRS 40.2516.) 
Roberts v. Second Judicial Dist. 
Court, 43 Nev. 332, 185 Pac. 
1067 (1920), distinguished, 
Beyer v. Second Judicial Dist. 
Court, 67 Nev. 480, at 488, 221 
P.2d 1024 (1950), Volpert v. 
Papagna, 83 Nev. 429, at 433, 
433 P.2d 533 (1967), Davidsohn 
v. Doyle, 108 Nev. 145, at 150, 
825 P.2d 1227 (1992)

Notice to quit must be 
made to appear by express 
averment in complaint. 
Before landlord can resort 
to summary remedy of action for 
unlawful detainer of premises 
held in month-to-month tenancy 
under sec. 1, ch. 27, Stats. 
1917 (cf. NRS 40.251), he must 
terminate tenancy by serving 
notice to quit possession as 
required by such section. Notice 
to quit, being part of statutory 
definition of offense, 
necessarily enters into gist of 
action and must be made to 
appear by express averment in 
complaint. Roberts v. Second 
Judicial Dist. Court, 43 Nev. 
332, 185 Pac. 1067 (1920), 
cited, Gasser v. Jet Craft, 
Ltd., 87 Nev. 376, at 380, 487 
P.2d 346 (1971)

Where complaint did not 
show that landlord had given 
unequivocal notice, action was 
not clearly for unlawful 
detainer and statutory period 
for appeals generally applied. 
In action in justice's 
court for possession of premises 
held in month-to-month tenancy 
and for damages, where complaint 
did not show that landlord had 
given tenant unequivocal notice 
to quit pursuant to sec. 1, ch. 
27, Stats. 1917 (cf. NRS 
40.251), action was not clearly 
for unlawful detainer, and 
district court had jurisdiction 
to proceed with action where 
appeal was taken within 30-day 
statutory period generally 
allowed for appeals from 
justice's court, but not within 
10-day period provided by RL º 
5601 (cf. NRS 40.380) in 
unlawful detainer actions. 
Mandamus issued requiring 
district court to proceed. 
Roberts v. Second Judicial Dist. 
Court, 43 Nev. 332, 185 Pac. 
1067 (1920), cited, State ex 
rel. Weber v. McFadden, 46 Nev. 
1, at 7, 205 Pac. 594 (1922), 
distinguished, Beyer v. Second 
Judicial Dist. Court, 67 Nev. 
480, at 488, 221 P.2d 1024 
(1950)

Water rights may be 
subject of unlawful detainer. 
Water rights may be 
subject of unlawful detainer 
under RL º 5588 (cf. NRS 40.250-
40.252) because they are realty 
as to which relation of landlord 
and tenant may exist. Nenzel v. 
Rochester Silver Corp., 50 Nev. 
352, 259 Pac. 632 (1927), cited, 
In re Filippini, 66 Nev. 17, at 
22, 202 P.2d 535 (1949), Carson 
City v. Estate of Lompa, 88 Nev. 
541, at 542, 501 P.2d 662 (1972)


40.2512 Unlawful detainer: Possession after 
default in payment of rent. A tenant of real 
property or a mobile home for a term less than life is 
guilty of an unlawful detainer when he continues in 
possession, in person or by subtenant, after default 
in the payment of any rent and after a notice in 
writing, requiring in the alternative the payment of 
the rent or the surrender of the detained premises, 
remains uncomplied with for a period of 5 days, or in 
the case of a mobile home lot, 10 days after service 
thereof. The notice may be served at any time after 
the rent becomes due.
(Added to NRS by 1985, 226)
NEVADA CASES.
Necessity of proving 
statutorily required facts. 
Where statute requires 
certain facts to be proved to 
warrant issuing of process in 
court of special and limited 
jurisdiction, if there be defect 
of proof as to essential point, 
process will be void. Paul v. 
Armstrong, 1 Nev. 82 (1865), 
cited, Phillips v. Snowden 
Placer Co., 40 Nev. 66, at 87, 
160 Pac. 786 (1916)

Complaint which did not 
allege fraud insufficient to 
warrant arrest of defendant. 
Under secs. 1, 2 and 9, 
ch. 46, Stats. 1865 (cf. NRS 
40.220-40.252, 40.254 and 
40.300), relating to forcible 
entry and unlawful detainer, 
complaint which did not allege 
fraud on part of defendant, 
either in making such forcible 
entry or in holding such 
possession by force, was 
radically defective and wholly 
insufficient to warrant arrest 
of defendant under statute. 
Strozzi v. Wines, 24 Nev. 389, 
55 Pac. 828, 57 Pac. 832 (1899)

Prima facie showing 
that landlord-tenant 
relationship exists should not 
preclude defendant from showing 
other facts. Purpose of 
unlawful detainer statute, RL º 
5588 (cf. NRS 40.250-40.252 and 
40.254), is to afford summary 
remedy to landlords where true 
relationship of landlord and 
tenant existed. Such 
relationship is foundation of 
action, and prima facie showing 
that relationship exists should 
not preclude defendant from 
showing other facts which would 
establish nonexistence of such 
relationship. Yori v. Phenix, 38 
Nev. 277, 149 Pac. 180 (1915), 
cited, Volpert v. Papagna, 83 
Nev. 429, at 434, 433 P.2d 533 
(1967)

Common law rule that 
title cannot be placed in issue 
in action for forcible entry 
does not apply in action for 
unlawful detainer. Action 
for unlawful detainer, as 
defined in RL º 5588 (cf. NRS 
40.250-40.252 and 40.254), is 
designed to afford to landlord 
summary remedy for recovery of 
leased premises and was unknown 
to common law. It affords 
different remedy than common law 
action of forcible detainer 
which is designed to keep peace, 
and rule that title cannot be 
placed in issue in action for 
common law forcible entry does 
not apply in action for unlawful 
detainer, which can be 
maintained only where landlord 
and tenant relationship exists 
or existed. Yori v. Phenix, 38 
Nev. 277, 149 Pac. 180 (1915), 
cited, Farnow v. Eighth Judicial 
Dist. Court, 64 Nev. 109, at 
121, 178 P.2d 371 (1947), 
Gibby's, Inc. v. Aylett, 96 Nev. 
678, at 680, 615 P.2d 949 (1980)

Defendant may introduce 
evidence that lease constituted 
mortgage. Action for 
unlawful detainer, defined in RL 
º 5588 (cf. NRS 40.250-40.252 
and 40.254), can be maintained 
only where landlord-tenant 
relationship exists or existed, 
and defendant in such action 
should have been permitted to 
introduce evidence showing that 
deed given by him to plaintiff, 
and lease given in return, did 
not create landlord-tenant 
relationship but constituted 
security transaction in 
connection with loan, and, 
pursuant to RL º 5518 (cf. NRS 
40.050), constituted mortgage 
which could be enforced only by 
action of foreclosure as 
provided by RL º 5501 (cf. NRS 
40.430). Yori v. Phenix, 38 Nev. 
277, 149 Pac. 180 (1915), cited, 
Hannig v. Conger, 54 Nev. 388, 
at 394, 19 P.2d 769 (1933), 
Flyge v. Flynn, 63 Nev. 201, at 
224, 166 P.2d 539 (1946), 
Volpert v. Papagna, 83 Nev. 429, 
at 434, 433 P.2d 533 (1967)

Complaint must show 
that detention of premises is 
unlawful within meaning of 
statute. One seeking 
summary relief in unlawful 
detainer action pursuant to sec. 
1, ch. 27, Stats. 1917 (cf. NRS 
40.250-40.252 and 40.254), must 
bring himself clearly within 
terms of detainer statute, and 
his complaint must show that 
detention of premises is 
unlawful within meaning of 
statute. Roberts v. Second 
Judicial Dist. Court, 43 Nev. 
332, 185 Pac. 1067 (1920), 
cited, Gasser v. Jet Craft, 
Ltd., 87 Nev. 376, at 380, 387 
P.2d 346 (1971)

Subsequent grantee of 
of reversion from lessor had no 
power to increase rent of lessee 
of water rights under certain 
written lease. Where 
defendant in action of unlawful 
detainer under sec. 1, ch. 27, 
Stats. 1917 (cf. NRS 40.2512), 
was in possession of water 
rights under written lease and 
subsequent oral agreement as to 
amount of rent, plaintiff, who 
was subsequent grantee of 
reversion from lessor, had no 
power to increase amount of 
rent, and because lease gave 
defendant option to extend lease 
and contained no requirement of 
notice of his election to do so, 
it was unnecessary for him to 
give notice. Judgment for 
plaintiff for possession of 
premises and for rent as 
increased was reversed and cause 
remanded for new trial. Nenzel 
v. Rochester Silver Corp., 48 
Nev. 41, 226 Pac. 1102 (1924)

Water rights may be 
subject of unlawful detainer. 
Water rights may be 
subject of unlawful detainer 
under RL º 5588 (cf. NRS 40.250-
40.252) because they are realty 
as to which relation of landlord 
and tenant may exist. Nenzel v. 
Rochester Silver Corp., 50 Nev. 
352, 259 Pac. 632 (1927), cited, 
In re Filippini, 66 Nev. 17, at 
22, 202 P.2d 535 (1949), Carson 
City v. Estate of Lompa, 88 Nev. 
541, at 542, 501 P.2d 662 (1972)

Court rule on payment 
of costs of previous action as 
condition precedent for 
successive action inapplicable 
where previous action was 
distinct claim. Even 
though successive unlawful 
detainer actions were brought by 
plaintiff against same 
defendant, fact that one was 
based on breach of covenant 
against subletting and other 
based on nonpayment of rent, 
which are distinct claims 
recognized in NRS 40.2512 and 
40.2514, prevented application 
of rule found in N.R.C.P. 41(d), 
which permits trial court to 
order payment of costs of 
previously dismissed action as 
condition precedent to 
maintenance of second action 
based upon or including same 
claim. Volpert v. Papagna, 83 
Nev. 429, 433 P.2d 533 (1967)

Notice to pay or quit 
which contained reservation of 
right to change amount of rent 
due was legally sufficient. 
In unlawful detainer 
action, where notice to pay or 
quit, which was required by NRS 
40.2512, contained reservation 
of right to change amount of 
rent shown as due, notice was 
legally sufficient because 
statute does not require 
specification of amount, and 
notice otherwise met substantial 
compliance test provided in NRS 
40.390. Volpert v. Papagna, 83 
Nev. 429, 433 P.2d 533 (1967), 
cited, Gasser v. Jet Craft, 
Ltd., 87 Nev. 376, at 380, 387 
P.2d 346 (1971)

Requirement that notice 
be in alternative was 
jurisdictional and court could 
not enter judgment for rent in 
absence of judgment for 
restitution. In unlawful 
detainer action, where notice to 
quit did not demand payment of 
rent, either in alternative or 
at all, trial court did not err 
in failing to determine amount 
of rent owing, because 
requirement of NRS 40.2512 that 
notice be in alternative was 
jurisdictional, and, under NRS 
40.360, court could not enter 
judgment for rent in absence of 
judgment for restitution. Claim 
for rent was incident to 
unlawful detainer, and failed 
when main object of action 
failed. Gasser v. Jet Craft, 
Ltd., 87 Nev. 376, 487 P.2d 346 
(1971), cited, American Fence, 
Inc. v. Wham, 93 Nev. 26, at 27, 
559 P.2d 824 (1977), American 
Fence, Inc. v. Wham, 95 Nev. 
788, at 791, 603 P.2d 274 
(1977), American Fence, Inc. v. 
Wham, 95 Nev. 788, at 791, 603 
P.2d 274 (1979), Gibby's, Inc. 
v. Aylett, 96 Nev. 678, at 681, 
615 P.2d 949 (1980)

FEDERAL AND OTHER CASES.
Constitutionality of 
prejudgment seizure of tenant's 
property. Provisions of 
former NRS 108.510 et seq., 
relating to liens of landlords 
of rental housing, which 
permitted prejudgment seizure of 
tenant's property without notice 
and hearing, were 
unconstitutional denial of 
procedural due process of law 
regardless of notice and 
opportunity for hearing afforded 
in unlawful detainer proceedings 
under NRS 40.215 et seq. (See 
NRS 40.2512 and 40.253.) Adams 
v. Sanson Inv. Co., 376 F. Supp. 
61 (1974)


40.2514 Unlawful detainer: Assignment or 
subletting contrary to lease; waste; unlawful 
business; nuisance; violations of controlled 
substances laws. A tenant of real property or a 
mobile home for a term less than life is guilty of an 
unlawful detainer when he:
1. Assigns or sublets the leased premises contrary 
to the covenants of the lease;
2. Commits or permits waste thereon;
3. Sets up or carries on therein or thereon any 
unlawful business;
4. Suffers permits or maintains on or about the 
premises any nuisance; or
5. Violates any of the provisions of NRS 453.011 to 
453.552, inclusive, except NRS 453.336, therein or 
thereon,
and remains in possession after service upon him of 3 
days' notice to quit.
(Added to NRS by 1985, 226; A 1989, 1232)
NRS CROSS REFERENCES.
Controlled substances, 
NRS chapter 453.
Possession of controlled 
substance not for purpose of 
sale, NRS 453.336.

NEVADA CASES.
Complaint which did not allege 
fraud insufficient to warrant 
arrest of defendant. Under 
secs. 1, 2 and 9, ch. 46, Stats. 
1865 (cf. NRS 40.220-40.252, 
40.254 and 40.300), relating to 
forcible entry and unlawful 
detainer, complaint which did 
not allege fraud on part of 
defendant, either in making such 
forcible entry or in holding 
such possession by force, was 
radically defective and wholly 
insufficient to warrant arrest 
of defendant under statute. 
Strozzi v. Wines, 24 Nev. 389, 
55 Pac. 828, 57 Pac. 832 (1899)

Prima facie showing 
that landlord-tenant 
relationship exists should not 
preclude defendant from showing 
other facts. Purpose of 
unlawful detainer statute, RL º 
5588 (cf. NRS 40.250-40.252 and 
40.254), is to afford summary 
remedy to landlords where true 
relationship of landlord and 
tenant existed. Such 
relationship is foundation of 
action, and prima facie showing 
that relationship exists should 
not preclude defendant from 
showing other facts which would 
establish nonexistence of such 
relationship. Yori v. Phenix, 38 
Nev. 277, 149 Pac. 180 (1915), 
cited, Volpert v. Papagna, 83 
Nev. 429, at 434, 433 P.2d 533 
(1967)

Common law rule that 
title cannot be placed in issue 
in action for forcible entry 
does not apply in action for 
unlawful detainer. Action 
for unlawful detainer, as 
defined in RL º 5588 (cf. NRS 
40.250-40.252 and 40.254), is 
designed to afford to landlord 
summary remedy for recovery of 
leased premises and was unknown 
to common law. It affords 
different remedy than common law 
action of forcible detainer 
which is designed to keep peace, 
and rule that title cannot be 
placed in issue in action for 
common law forcible entry does 
not apply in action for unlawful 
detainer, which can be 
maintained only where landlord 
and tenant relationship exists 
or existed. Yori v. Phenix, 38 
Nev. 277, 149 Pac. 180 (1915), 
cited, Farnow v. Eighth Judicial 
Dist. Court, 64 Nev. 109, at 
121, 178 P.2d 371 (1947), 
Gibby's, Inc. v. Aylett, 96 Nev. 
678, at 680, 615 P.2d 949 (1980)

Defendant may introduce 
evidence that lease constituted 
mortgage. Action for 
unlawful detainer, defined in RL 
º 5588 (cf. NRS 40.250-40.252 
and 40.254), can be maintained 
only where landlord-tenant 
relationship exists or existed, 
and defendant in such action 
should have been permitted to 
introduce evidence showing that 
deed given by him to plaintiff, 
and lease given in return, did 
not create landlord-tenant 
relationship but constituted 
security transaction in 
connection with loan, and, 
pursuant to RL º 5518 (cf. NRS 
40.050), constituted mortgage 
which could be enforced only by 
action of foreclosure as 
provided by RL º 5501 (cf. NRS 
40.430). Yori v. Phenix, 38 Nev. 
277, 149 Pac. 180 (1915), cited, 
Hannig v. Conger, 54 Nev. 388, 
at 394, 19 P.2d 769 (1933), 
Flyge v. Flynn, 63 Nev. 201, at 
224, 166 P.2d 539 (1946), 
Volpert v. Papagna, 83 Nev. 429, 
at 434, 433 P.2d 533 (1967)

Complaint must show 
that detention of premises is 
unlawful within meaning of 
statute. One seeking 
summary relief in unlawful 
detainer action pursuant to sec. 
1, ch. 27, Stats. 1917 (cf. NRS 
40.250-40.252 and 40.254), must 
bring himself clearly within 
terms of detainer statute, and 
his complaint must show that 
detention of premises is 
unlawful within meaning of 
statute. Roberts v. Second 
Judicial Dist. Court, 43 Nev. 
332, 185 Pac. 1067 (1920), 
cited, Gasser v. Jet Craft, 
Ltd., 87 Nev. 376, at 380, 387 
P.2d 346 (1971)

Water rights may be 
subject of unlawful detainer. 
Water rights may be 
subject of unlawful detainer 
under RL º 5588 (cf. NRS 40.250-
40.252) because they are realty 
as to which relation of landlord 
and tenant may exist. Nenzel v. 
Rochester Silver Corp., 50 Nev. 
352, 259 Pac. 632 (1927), cited, 
In re Filippini, 66 Nev. 17, at 
22, 202 P.2d 535 (1949), Carson 
City v. Estate of Lompa, 88 Nev. 
541, at 542, 501 P.2d 662 (1972)

Court rule on payment 
of costs of previous action as 
condition precedent for 
successive action inapplicable 
where previous action was 
distinct claim. Even 
though successive unlawful 
detainer actions were brought by 
plaintiff against same 
defendant, fact that one was 
based on breach of covenant 
against subletting and other 
based on nonpayment of rent, 
which are distinct claims 
recognized in NRS 40.2512 and 
40.2514, prevented application 
of rule found in N.R.C.P. 41(d), 
which permits trial court to 
order payment of costs of 
previously dismissed action as 
condition precedent to 
maintenance of second action 
based upon or including same 
claim. Volpert v. Papagna, 83 
Nev. 429, 433 P.2d 533 (1967)


40.2516 Unlawful detainer: Possession after 
failure to perform conditions of lease; saving lease 
from forfeiture. A tenant of real property or a 
mobile home for a term less than life is guilty of an 
unlawful detainer when he continues in possession, in 
person or by subtenant, after a neglect or failure to 
perform any condition or covenant of the lease or 
agreement under which the property or mobile home is 
held, other than those mentioned in NRS 40.250 to 
40.252, inclusive, and NRS 40.254, and after notice in 
writing, requiring in the alternative the performance 
of the condition or covenant or the surrender of the 
property, served upon him, and, if there is a 
subtenant in actual occupation of the premises, also 
upon the subtenant, remains uncomplied with for 5 days 
after the service thereof. Within 3 days after the 
service, the tenant, or any subtenant in actual 
occupation of the premises, or any mortgagee of the 
term, or other person, interested in its continuance, 
may perform the condition or covenant and thereby save 
the lease from forfeiture; but if the covenants and 
conditions of the lease, violated by the lessee, 
cannot afterwards be performed, then no notice need be 
given.
(Added to NRS by 1985, 226)
NEVADA CASES.
Complaint which did not allege 
fraud insufficient to warrant 
arrest of defendant. Under 
secs. 1, 2 and 9, ch. 46, Stats. 
1865 (cf. NRS 40.220-40.252, 
40.254 and 40.300), relating to 
forcible entry and unlawful 
detainer, complaint which did 
not allege fraud on part of 
defendant, either in making such 
forcible entry or in holding 
such possession by force, was 
radically defective and wholly 
insufficient to warrant arrest 
of defendant under statute. 
Strozzi v. Wines, 24 Nev. 389, 
55 Pac. 828, 57 Pac. 832 (1899)

Prima facie showing 
that landlord-tenant 
relationship exists should not 
preclude defendant from showing 
other facts. Purpose of 
unlawful detainer statute, RL º 
5588 (cf. NRS 40.250-40.252 and 
40.254), is to afford summary 
remedy to landlords where true 
relationship of landlord and 
tenant existed. Such 
relationship is foundation of 
action, and prima facie showing 
that relationship exists should 
not preclude defendant from 
showing other facts which would 
establish nonexistence of such 
relationship. Yori v. Phenix, 38 
Nev. 277, 149 Pac. 180 (1915), 
cited, Volpert v. Papagna, 83 
Nev. 429, at 434, 433 P.2d 533 
(1967)

Common law rule that 
title cannot be placed in issue 
in action for forcible entry 
does not apply in action for 
unlawful detainer. Action 
for unlawful detainer, as 
defined in RL º 5588 (cf. NRS 
40.250-40.252 and 40.254), is 
designed to afford to landlord 
summary remedy for recovery of 
leased premises and was unknown 
to common law. It affords 
different remedy than common law 
action of forcible detainer 
which is designed to keep peace, 
and rule that title cannot be 
placed in issue in action for 
common law forcible entry does 
not apply in action for unlawful 
detainer, which can be 
maintained only where landlord 
and tenant relationship exists 
or existed. Yori v. Phenix, 38 
Nev. 277, 149 Pac. 180 (1915), 
cited, Farnow v. Eighth Judicial 
Dist. Court, 64 Nev. 109, at 
121, 178 P.2d 371 (1947), 
Gibby's, Inc. v. Aylett, 96 Nev. 
678, at 680, 615 P.2d 949 (1980)

Defendant may introduce 
evidence that lease constituted 
mortgage. Action for 
unlawful detainer, defined in RL 
º 5588 (cf. NRS 40.250-40.252 
and 40.254), can be maintained 
only where landlord-tenant 
relationship exists or existed, 
and defendant in such action 
should have been permitted to 
introduce evidence showing that 
deed given by him to plaintiff, 
and lease given in return, did 
not create landlord-tenant 
relationship but constituted 
security transaction in 
connection with loan, and, 
pursuant to RL º 5518 (cf. NRS 
40.050), constituted mortgage 
which could be enforced only by 
action of foreclosure as 
provided by RL º 5501 (cf. NRS 
40.430). Yori v. Phenix, 38 Nev. 
277, 149 Pac. 180 (1915), cited, 
Hannig v. Conger, 54 Nev. 388, 
at 394, 19 P.2d 769 (1933), 
Flyge v. Flynn, 63 Nev. 201, at 
224, 166 P.2d 539 (1946), 
Volpert v. Papagna, 83 Nev. 429, 
at 434, 433 P.2d 533 (1967)

Complaint must show 
that detention of premises is 
unlawful within meaning of 
statute. One seeking 
summary relief in unlawful 
detainer action pursuant to sec. 
1, ch. 27, Stats. 1917 (cf. NRS 
40.250-40.252 and 40.254), must 
bring himself clearly within 
terms of detainer statute, and 
his complaint must show that 
detention of premises is 
unlawful within meaning of 
statute. Roberts v. Second 
Judicial Dist. Court, 43 Nev. 
332, 185 Pac. 1067 (1920), 
cited, Gasser v. Jet Craft, 
Ltd., 87 Nev. 376, at 380, 387 
P.2d 346 (1971)

Notice to quit must be 
specific and peremptory. 
To terminate month-to-
month tenancy so that detention 
thereafter will be unlawful 
pursuant to sec. 1, ch. 27, 
Stats. 1917 (cf. NRS 40.251), 
notice to quit must be specific 
and peremptory. Conditional or 
uncertain notice will not answer 
requirements of statute. Where 
notice stated that use of 
premises disturbed other tenants 
of building and that landlord 
could not continue to rent 
premises for such purpose, 
notice was not sufficient under 
statute. (See NRS 40.2516.) 
Roberts v. Second Judicial Dist. 
Court, 43 Nev. 332, 185 Pac. 
1067 (1920), distinguished, 
Beyer v. Second Judicial Dist. 
Court, 67 Nev. 480, at 488, 221 
P.2d 1024 (1950), Volpert v. 
Papagna, 83 Nev. 429, at 433, 
433 P.2d 533 (1967), Davidsohn 
v. Doyle, 108 Nev. 145, at 150, 
825 P.2d 1227 (1992)

Water rights may be 
subject of unlawful detainer. 
Water rights may be 
subject of unlawful detainer 
under RL º 5588 (cf. NRS 40.250-
40.252) because they are realty 
as to which relation of landlord 
and tenant may exist. Nenzel v. 
Rochester Silver Corp., 50 Nev. 
352, 259 Pac. 632 (1927), cited, 
In re Filippini, 66 Nev. 17, at 
22, 202 P.2d 535 (1949), Carson 
City v. Estate of Lompa, 88 Nev. 
541, at 542, 501 P.2d 662 (1972)

Acceptance of rent with 
knowledge of default constituted 
waiver of right of lessor to 
terminate lease. In action 
by lessee to recover agreed 
portion of deposit made pursuant 
to covenant to improve premises, 
where lessor counterclaimed for 
forfeiture of lease by reason of 
breaches of terms, acceptance by 
lessor of rent with knowledge of 
default was consistent only with 
intent to hold lessee to terms 
of lease, constituted affirmance 
of lease and waived right of 
lessor to claim forfeiture. (See 
NRS 40.2516.) Sharp v. Twin 
Lakes Corp., 71 Nev. 162, 283 
P.2d 611 (1955), cited, Reno 
Realty & Inv. Co. v. Hornstein, 
72 Nev. 219, at 224, 301 P.2d 
1051 (1956), Summa Corp. v. 
Richardson, 93 Nev. 228, at 234, 
564 P.2d 181 (1977), 
distinguished, Davidsohn v. 
Doyle, 108 Nev. 145, at 148, 825 
P.2d 1227 (1992)

Notice to quit 
jurisdictionally required to be 
phrased in alternative with 
respect to default capable of 
being cured. In unlawful 
detainer action, where notice to 
quit did not specify alleged 
violations of lease covenants 
nor demand cure of alleged 
defaults, and complaint listed 
alleged violations of covenants 
all of which were susceptible to 
cure, judgment for defendant was 
affirmed on appeal, because, 
under NRS 40.2516, notice to 
quit must be phrased in 
alternative with respect to any 
default which is capable of 
being cured, and such 
requirement is jurisdictional. 
Gasser v. Jet Craft, Ltd., 87 
Nev. 376, 487 P.2d 346 (1971), 
cited, American Fence, Inc. v. 
Wham, 95 Nev. 788, at 791, 603 
P.2d 274 (1979)

Compliance with notice 
requirement. Before 
terminating lease and 
dispossessing lessee, lessor 
must comply with notice 
provision of former subsection 
1(e) of NRS 40.250 (cf. NRS 
40.2516). It may neither be 
waived or neglected. Aikens v. 
Andrews, 91 Nev. 746, 542 P.2d 
734 (1975)

Lessor who sought to 
terminate lease of commercial 
property pursuant to provision 
of lease was not required to 
comply with notice provisions of 
section. Where provision 
in lease of commercial property 
permitted lessor to reenter 
property and terminate lease 
upon breach by lessee, and 
lessor, upon breach by lessee, 
sent letter to lessee 
terminating lease, lessee could 
not prevail on argument that 
lessor had failed to comply with 
requirements of NRS 40.2516 
concerning notice requirements 
in actions for unlawful 
detainer, because lessor who 
seeks termination of lease 
pursuant to provision of lease 
is not obligated to meet notice 
requirements of NRS 40.2516. 
Davidsohn v. Doyle, 108 Nev. 
145, 825 P.2d 1227 (1992)

Acceptance of rent 
after breach did not constitute 
waiver of right of lessor to 
terminate lease. 
Acceptance of rent by 
lessor after breach of lease by 
lessee did not constitute waiver 
of right of lessor to terminate 
lease where (1) lessor timely 
pursued his action to terminate 
lease, (2) lessor did not induce 
lessee into believing breach 
would be excused by payment of 
rent, (3) lessee opposed action 
and remained in possession of 
leased premises, (4) lease 
involved commercial property and 
lessee was businesswoman 
subleasing property for profit 
and not unsophisticated 
residential tenant in need of 
special protection from lessor, 
and (5) requiring lessor to 
forego rental payments until 
resolution of lengthy dispute 
would have been unduly 
burdensome. (See NRS 40.2516.) 
Davidsohn v. Doyle, 108 Nev. 
145, 825 P.2d 1227 (1992)


40.252 Unlawful detainer: Contractual 
provisions void if contrary to specified periods of 
notice; notice to quit or surrender by colessor is 
valid unless showing other colessors did not authorize 
notice. For the purposes of NRS 40.250 to 
40.252, inclusive, and NRS 40.254:
1. It is unlawful for a landlord to attempt by 
contract or other agreement to shorten the specified 
periods of notice and any such contract or agreement 
is void.
2. Notice to quit or surrender the premises which 
was given by one colessor of real property or a mobile 
home is valid unless it is affirmatively shown that 
one or more of the other colessors did not authorize 
the giving of the notice.
(Added to NRS by 1985, 227)

NEVADA CASES.
Complaint which did not allege 
fraud insufficient to warrant 
arrest of defendant. Under 
secs. 1, 2 and 9, ch. 46, Stats. 
1865 (cf. NRS 40.220-40.252, 
40.254 and 40.300), relating to 
forcible entry and unlawful 
detainer, complaint which did 
not allege fraud on part of 
defendant, either in making such 
forcible entry or in holding 
such possession by force, was 
radically defective and wholly 
insufficient to warrant arrest 
of defendant under statute. 
Strozzi v. Wines, 24 Nev. 389, 
55 Pac. 828, 57 Pac. 832 (1899)

Prima facie showing 
that landlord-tenant 
relationship exists should not 
preclude defendant from showing 
other facts. Purpose of 
unlawful detainer statute, RL º 
5588 (cf. NRS 40.250-40.252 and 
40.254), is to afford summary 
remedy to landlords where true 
relationship of landlord and 
tenant existed. Such 
relationship is foundation of 
action, and prima facie showing 
that relationship exists should 
not preclude defendant from 
showing other facts which would 
establish nonexistence of such 
relationship. Yori v. Phenix, 38 
Nev. 277, 149 Pac. 180 (1915), 
cited, Volpert v. Papagna, 83 
Nev. 429, at 434, 433 P.2d 533 
(1967)

Common law rule that 
title cannot be placed in issue 
in action for forcible entry 
does not apply in action for 
unlawful detainer. Action 
for unlawful detainer, as 
defined in RL º 5588 (cf. NRS 
40.250-40.252 and 40.254), is 
designed to afford to landlord 
summary remedy for recovery of 
leased premises and was unknown 
to common law. It affords 
different remedy than common law 
action of forcible detainer 
which is designed to keep peace, 
and rule that title cannot be 
placed in issue in action for 
common law forcible entry does 
not apply in action for unlawful 
detainer, which can be 
maintained only where landlord 
and tenant relationship exists 
or existed. Yori v. Phenix, 38 
Nev. 277, 149 Pac. 180 (1915), 
cited, Farnow v. Eighth Judicial 
Dist. Court, 64 Nev. 109, at 
121, 178 P.2d 371 (1947), 
Gibby's, Inc. v. Aylett, 96 Nev. 
678, at 680, 615 P.2d 949 (1980)

Defendant can introduce 
evidence that lease constituted 
mortgage. Action for 
unlawful detainer, defined in RL 
º 5588 (cf. NRS 40.250-40.252 
and 40.254), can be maintained 
only where landlord-tenant 
relationship exists or existed, 
and defendant in such action 
should have been permitted to 
introduce evidence showing that 
deed given by him to plaintiff, 
and lease given in return, did 
not create landlord-tenant 
relationship but constituted 
security transaction in 
connection with loan, and, 
pursuant to RL º 5518 (cf. NRS 
40.050), constituted mortgage 
which could be enforced only by 
action of foreclosure as 
provided by RL º 5501 (cf. NRS 
40.430). Yori v. Phenix, 38 Nev. 
277, 149 Pac. 180 (1915), cited, 
Hannig v. Conger, 54 Nev. 388, 
at 394, 19 P.2d 769 (1933), 
Flyge v. Flynn, 63 Nev. 201, at 
224, 166 P.2d 539 (1946), 
Volpert v. Papagna, 83 Nev. 429, 
at 434, 433 P.2d 533 (1967)

Complaint must show 
that detention of premises is 
unlawful within meaning of 
statute. One seeking 
summary relief in unlawful 
detainer action pursuant to sec. 
1, ch. 27, Stats. 1917 (cf. NRS 
40.250-40.252 and 40.254), must 
bring himself clearly within 
terms of detainer statute, and 
his complaint must show that 
detention of premises is 
unlawful within meaning of 
statute. Roberts v. Second 
Judicial Dist. Court, 43 Nev. 
332, 185 Pac. 1067 (1920), 
cited, Gasser v. Jet Craft, 
Ltd., 87 Nev. 376, at 380, 387 
P.2d 346 (1971)

Water rights may be 
subject of unlawful detainer. 
Water rights may be 
subject of unlawful detainer 
under RL º 5588 (cf. NRS 40.250-
40.252) because they are realty 
as to which relation of landlord 
and tenant may exist. Nenzel v. 
Rochester Silver Corp., 50 Nev. 
352, 259 Pac. 632 (1927), cited, 
In re Filippini, 66 Nev. 17, at 
22, 202 P.2d 535 (1949), Carson 
City v. Estate of Lompa, 88 Nev. 
541, at 542, 501 P.2d 662 (1972)


40.253 Unlawful detainer: Supplemental remedy 
of summary eviction and exclusion of tenant for 
default in payment of rent.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 9, in 
addition to the remedy provided in NRS 40.2512 and in 
NRS 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive, when the tenant of 
any dwelling, apartment, mobile home, recreational 
vehicle or commercial premises with periodic rent 
reserved by the month or any shorter period, is in 
default in payment of the rent, the landlord or his 
agent, unless otherwise agreed in writing, may serve 
or have served a notice in writing, requiring in the 
alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender 
of the premises:
(a) At or before noon of the fifth full day 
following the day of service; or
(b) If the landlord chooses not to proceed in the 
manner set forth in paragraph (a) and the rent is 
reserved by a period of 1 week or less and the tenancy 
has not continued for more than 45 days, at or before 
noon of the fourth full day following the day of 
service. As used in this paragraph, "day of service" 
means the day the landlord or his agent personally 
delivers the notice to the tenant. If personal service 
was not so delivered, the "day of service" means the 
day the notice is delivered, after posting and mailing 
pursuant to subsection 2, to the sheriff or constable 
for service if the request for service is made before 
noon. If the request for service by the sheriff or 
constable is made after noon, the "day of service" 
shall be deemed to be the day next following the day 
that the request is made for service by the sheriff or 
constable.
2. A landlord or his agent who serves a notice to a 
tenant pursuant to paragraph (b) of subsection 1 shall 
attempt to deliver the notice in person in the manner 
set forth in paragraph (a) of subsection 1 of NRS 
40.280. If the notice cannot be delivered in person, 
the landlord or his agent:
(a) Shall post a copy of the notice in a conspicuous 
place on the premises and mail the notice by overnight 
mail; and
(b) After the notice has been posted and mailed, may 
deliver the notice to the sheriff or constable for 
service in the manner set forth in subsection 1 of NRS 
40.280. The sheriff or constable shall not accept the 
notice for service unless it is accompanied by written 
evidence, signed by the tenant when he took possession 
of the premises, that the landlord or his agent 
informed the tenant of the provisions of this section 
which set forth the lawful procedures for eviction 
from a short-term tenancy. Upon acceptance, the 
sheriff or constable shall serve the notice within 48 
hours after the request for service was made by the 
landlord or his agent.
3. A notice served pursuant to subsection 1 or 2 
must:
(a) Identify the court that has jurisdiction over 
the matter; and
(b) Advise the tenant of his right to contest the 
matter by filing, within the time specified in 
subsection 1 for the payment of the rent or surrender 
of the premises, an affidavit with the court that has 
jurisdiction over the matter stating that he has 
tendered payment or is not in default in the payment 
of the rent.
4. If the tenant files such an affidavit at or 
before the time stated in the notice, the landlord or 
his agent, after receipt of a file-stamped copy of the 
affidavit which was filed, shall not provide for the 
nonadmittance of the tenant to the premises by locking 
or otherwise.
5. Upon noncompliance with the notice:
(a) The landlord or his agent may apply by affidavit 
to the justice's court of the township in which the 
dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial 
premises are located or to the district court of the 
county in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home 
or commercial premises are located, whichever has 
jurisdiction over the matter. The court may thereupon 
issue an order directing the sheriff or constable of 
the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after 
receipt of the order. The affidavit provided for in 
this paragraph must contain:
(1) The date the tenancy commenced.
(2) The amount of periodic rent reserved.
(3) The amounts of any cleaning, security or rent 
deposits paid in advance, in excess of the first 
month's rent, by the tenant.
(4) The date the rental payments became 
delinquent.
(5) The length of time the tenant has remained in 
possession without paying rent.
(6) The amount of rent claimed due and delinquent.
(7) A statement that the written notice was served 
on the tenant in accordance with NRS 40.280.
(8) A copy of the written notice served on the 
tenant.
(9) A copy of the signed written rental agreement, 
if any.
(b) Except where the tenant has timely filed the 
affidavit described in subsection 3 and a file-stamped 
copy of it has been received by the landlord or his 
agent, the landlord or his agent may, in a peaceable 
manner, provide for the nonadmittance of the tenant to 
the premises by locking or otherwise.
6. Upon the filing by the tenant of the affidavit 
permitted in subsection 3 and the filing by the 
landlord of the affidavit permitted by subsection 5, 
the justice's court or the district court shall hold a 
hearing, after service of notice of the hearing upon 
the parties, to determine the truthfulness and 
sufficiency of any affidavit or notice provided for in 
this section. If the court determines that there is no 
legal defense as to the alleged unlawful detainer and 
the tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer, the 
court may issue a summary order for removal of the 
tenant or an order providing for the nonadmittance of 
the tenant pursuant to subsection 5. If the court 
determines that there is a legal defense as to the 
alleged unlawful detainer, the court shall refuse to 
grant either party any relief, and, except as 
otherwise provided in this subsection, shall require 
that any further proceedings be conducted pursuant to 
NRS 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive. The issuance of a 
summary order for removal of the tenant does not 
preclude an action by the tenant for any damages or 
other relief to which he may be entitled. If the 
alleged unlawful detainer was based upon subsection 5 
of NRS 40.2514, the refusal by the court to grant 
relief does not preclude the landlord thereafter from 
pursuing an action for unlawful detainer in accordance 
with NRS 40.251.
7. The tenant may, upon payment of the appropriate 
fees relating to the filing and service of a motion, 
file a motion with the court, on a form provided by 
the clerk of the court, to dispute the amount of the 
costs, if any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS 
118A.460 for the inventory, moving and storage of 
personal property left on the premises. The motion 
must be filed within 20 days after the summary order 
for removal of the tenant or the abandonment of the 
premises by the tenant, or within 20 days after:
(a) The tenant has vacated or been removed from the 
premises; and
(b) A copy of those charges has been requested by or 
provided to the tenant,
whichever is later.
8. Upon the filing of a motion pursuant to 
subsection 7, the court shall schedule a hearing on 
the motion. The hearing must be held within 10 days 
after the filing of the motion. The court shall affix 
the date of the hearing to the motion and order a copy 
served upon the landlord by the sheriff, constable or 
other process server. At the hearing, the court may:
(a) Determine the costs, if any, claimed by the 
landlord pursuant to NRS 118A.460, and any 
accumulating daily costs; and
(b) Order the release of the tenant's property upon 
the payment of the charges determined to be due or if 
no charges are determined to be due.
9. This section does not apply to the tenant of a 
mobile home lot in a mobile home park or to the tenant 
of a recreational vehicle lot in an area of a mobile 
home park in this state other than an area designated 
as a recreational vehicle lot pursuant to the 
provisions of subsection 6 of NRS 40.215.
(Added to NRS by 1967, 195; A 1969, 263, 575; 1973, 
1085; 1975, 1202; 1977, 418, 1346; 1979, 1398, 1879; 
1985, 229; 1987, 1239; 1989, 1082, 1232; 1991, 113; 
1995, 1851)

NEVADA CASES.
Termination of lease. In 
action by lessor to terminate 
lease, recover amount due from 
lessee and appoint receiver to 
take charge of leased premises 
during pendency of litigation, 
where lease provided that, upon 
lessee's default, lessor could 
reenter premises, take 
possession of lessee's business 
and declare lease to be 
terminated or, if lessor elected 
to file suit in equity, receiver 
could be appointed to sell 
business to pay existing claims, 
it was error for trial court to 
order receiver to sell remaining 
term of lease with other assets 
of business on ground that 
lessor's request for receiver 
was election of remedies which 
required partial forfeiture of 
lease and precluded him from 
terminating remaining term of 
lease. There is nothing 
unreasonable or unconscionable 
in permitting lessor to 
terminate lease and seek 
appointment of receiver to 
conduct business while 
termination of lease is being 
litigated. Lynn v. Ingalls, 100 
Nev. 115, 676 P.2d 797 
(1984)

FEDERAL AND OTHER CASES.
Constitutionality of 
prejudgment seizure of tenant's 
property. Provisions of 
former NRS 108.510 et seq., 
relating to liens of landlords 
of rental housing, which 
permitted prejudgment seizure of 
tenant's property without notice 
and hearing, were 
unconstitutional denial of 
procedural due process of law 
regardless of notice and 
opportunity for hearing afforded 
in unlawful detainer proceedings 
under NRS 40.215 et seq. (See 
NRS 40.2512 and 40.253.) Adams 
v. Sanson Inv. Co., 376 F. Supp. 
61 (1974)


40.254 Unlawful detainer: Supplemental remedy 
of summary eviction and exclusion of tenant from 
certain types of property. Except as otherwise 
provided by specific statute, in addition to the 
remedy provided in NRS 40.251 and in NRS 40.290 to 
40.420, inclusive, when the tenant of a dwelling unit 
which is subject to the provisions of chapter 118A of 
NRS, part of a low-rent housing program operated by a 
public housing authority, a mobile home or a 
recreational vehicle is guilty of an unlawful 
detainer, the landlord is entitled to the summary 
procedures provided in NRS 40.253 except that:
1. Written notice to surrender the premises must:
(a) Be given to the tenant in accordance with the 
provisions of NRS 40.280;
(b) Advise the tenant of the court that has 
jurisdiction over the matter; and
(c) Advise the tenant of his right to contest the 
notice by filing within 5 days an affidavit with the 
court that has jurisdiction over the matter that he is 
not guilty of an unlawful detainer.
2. The affidavit of the landlord or his agent 
submitted to the justice's court or the district court 
must contain:
(a) The date when the tenancy commenced, the term of 
the tenancy, and, if any, a copy of the rental 
agreement.
(b) The date when the tenancy or rental agreement 
allegedly terminated.
(c) The date when the tenant became subject to the 
provisions of NRS 40.251 to 40.2516, inclusive, 
together with any supporting facts.
(d) The date when the written notice was given, a 
copy of the notice and a statement that notice was 
served in accordance with NRS 40.280.
(e) A statement that the claim for relief was 
authorized by law.
3. If the tenant is found guilty of unlawful 
detainer as a result of his violation of any of the 
provisions of NRS 453.011 to 453.552, inclusive, 
except NRS 453.336, the landlord is entitled to be 
awarded any reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the 
landlord or his agent as a result of a hearing, if 
any, held pursuant to subsection 6 of NRS 40.253 
wherein the tenant contested the eviction.
(Added to NRS by 1985, 227; A 1989, 1084, 1234; 
1991, 115; 1995, 1853)
NEVADA CASES.
Complaint which did not allege 
fraud insufficient to warrant 
arrest of defendant. Under 
secs. 1, 2 and 9, ch. 46, Stats. 
1865 (cf. NRS 40.220-40.252, 
40.254 and 40.300), relating to 
forcible entry and unlawful 
detainer, complaint which did 
not allege fraud on part of 
defendant, either in making such 
forcible entry or in holding 
such possession by force, was 
radically defective and wholly 
insufficient to warrant arrest 
of defendant under statute. 
Strozzi v. Wines, 24 Nev. 389, 
55 Pac. 828, 57 Pac. 832 (1899)

Prima facie showing 
that landlord-tenant 
relationship exists should not 
preclude defendant from showing 
other facts. Purpose of 
unlawful detainer statute, RL º 
5588 (cf. NRS 40.250-40.252 and 
40.254), is to afford summary 
remedy to landlords where true 
relationship of landlord and 
tenant existed. Such 
relationship is foundation of 
action, and prima facie showing 
that relationship exists should 
not preclude defendant from 
showing other facts which would 
establish nonexistence of such 
relationship. Yori v. Phenix, 38 
Nev. 277, 149 Pac. 180 (1915), 
cited, Volpert v. Papagna, 83 
Nev. 429, at 434, 433 P.2d 533 
(1967)

Common law rule that 
title cannot be placed in issue 
in action for forcible entry 
does not apply in action for 
unlawful detainer. Action 
for unlawful detainer, as 
defined in RL º 5588 (cf. NRS 
40.250-40.252 and 40.254), is 
designed to afford to landlord 
summary remedy for recovery of 
leased premises and was unknown 
to common law. It affords 
different remedy than common law 
action of forcible detainer 
which is designed to keep peace, 
and rule that title cannot be 
placed in issue in action for 
common law forcible entry does 
not apply in action for unlawful 
detainer, which can be 
maintained only where landlord 
and tenant relationship exists 
or existed. Yori v. Phenix, 38 
Nev. 277, 149 Pac. 180 (1915), 
cited, Farnow v. Eighth Judicial 
Dist. Court, 64 Nev. 109, at 
121, 178 P.2d 371 (1947), 
Gibby's, Inc. v. Aylett, 96 Nev. 
678, at 680, 615 P.2d 949 (1980)

Defendant may introduce 
evidence that lease constituted 
mortgage. Action for 
unlawful detainer, defined in RL 
º 5588 (cf. NRS 40.250-40.252 
and 40.254), can be maintained 
only where landlord-tenant 
relationship exists or existed, 
and defendant in such action 
should have been permitted to 
introduce evidence showing that 
deed given by him to plaintiff, 
and lease given in return, did 
not create landlord-tenant 
relationship but constituted 
security transaction in 
connection with loan, and, 
pursuant to RL º 5518 (cf. NRS 
40.050), constituted mortgage 
which could be enforced only by 
action of foreclosure as 
provided by RL º 5501 (cf. NRS 
40.430). Yori v. Phenix, 38 Nev. 
277, 149 Pac. 180 (1915), cited, 
Hannig v. Conger, 54 Nev. 388, 
at 394, 19 P.2d 769 (1933), 
Flyge v. Flynn, 63 Nev. 201, at 
224, 166 P.2d 539 (1946), 
Volpert v. Papagna, 83 Nev. 429, 
at 434, 433 P.2d 533 (1967)

Complaint must show 
that detention is unlawful 
within meaning of statute. 
One seeking summary relief 
in unlawful detainer action 
pursuant to sec. 1, ch. 27, 
Stats. 1917 (cf. NRS 40.250-
40.252 and 40.254), must bring 
himself clearly within terms of 
detainer statute, and his 
complaint must show that 
detention of premises is 
unlawful within meaning of 
statute. Roberts v. Second 
Judicial Dist. Court, 43 Nev. 
332, 185 Pac. 1067 (1920), 
cited, Gasser v. Jet Craft, 
Ltd., 87 Nev. 376, at 380, 387 
P.2d 346 (1971)


40.255 Removal of person holding over after 
3-day notice to quit; circumstances authorizing 
removal.
1. Except as provided in subsection 2, in any of 
the following cases, a person who holds over and 
continues in possession of real property or a mobile 
home after a 3-day written notice to quit has been 
served upon him, and also upon any subtenant in actual 
occupation of the premises, pursuant to NRS 40.280, 
may be removed as prescribed in NRS 40.290 to 40.420, 
inclusive:
(a) Where the property or mobile home has been sold 
under an execution against him or a person under whom 
he claims, and the title under the sale has been 
perfected;
(b) Where the property or mobile home has been sold 
upon the foreclosure of a mortgage, or under an 
express power of sale contained therein, executed by 
him or a person under whom he claims, and the title 
under the sale has been perfected;
(c) Where the property or mobile home has been sold 
under a power of sale granted by NRS 107.080 to the 
trustee of a deed of trust executed by such person or 
a person under whom he claims, and the title under 
such sale has been perfected; or
(d) Where the property or mobile home has been sold 
by him or a person under whom he claims, and the title 
under the sale has been perfected.
2. This section does not apply to the tenant of a 
mobile home lot in a mobile home park.
(Added to NRS by 1961, 412; A 1969, 263; 1979, 1880)

40.260 Tenant of agricultural lands may hold 
over if not notified. In all cases of tenancy 
upon agricultural land where the tenant has held over 
and retained possession for more than 60 days after 
the expiration of his term, without any demand of 
possession or notice to quit by the landlord, or the 
successor in estate of his landlord, if any there be, 
he shall be deemed to be holding by permission of the 
landlord, or the successor in the estate of his 
landlord, if any there be, and shall be entitled to 
hold under the terms of the lease for another full 
year, and shall not be guilty of an unlawful detainer 
during the year, and such holding over for the period 
aforesaid shall be taken and construed as a consent on 
the part of the tenant to hold for another year.
[1911 CPA º 647; RL º 5589; NCL º 9136]

40.270 Tenant has similar remedies against 
subtenant. A tenant may take proceedings 
similar to those prescribed in this chapter, to obtain 
possession of the premises let to any under tenant, in 
case of his unlawful detention of the premises 
underlet to him.
[1911 CPA º 648; RL º 5590; NCL º 9137]

40.280 Service of notices to quit; proof 
required before issuance of order to remove.
1. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 40.253, the 
notices required by NRS 40.251 to 40.260, inclusive, 
may be served:
(a) By delivering a copy to the tenant personally, 
in the presence of a witness;
(b) If he is absent from his place of residence or 
from his usual place of business, by leaving a copy 
with a person of suitable age and discretion at either 
place and mailing a copy to the tenant at his place of 
residence or place of business; or
(c) If the place of residence or business cannot be 
ascertained, or a person of suitable age or discretion 
cannot be found there, by posting a copy in a 
conspicuous place on the leased property, delivering a 
copy to a person there residing, if the person can be 
found, and mailing a copy to the tenant at the place 
where the leased property is situated.
2. Service upon a subtenant may be made in the same 
manner as provided in subsection 1.
3. Before an order to remove a tenant is issued 
pursuant to subsection 6 of NRS 40.253, a landlord 
shall file with the court a proof of service of any 
notice required by that section. Except as otherwise 
provided in subsection 4, this proof must consist of:
(a) A statement, signed by the tenant and a witness, 
acknowledging that the tenant received the notice on a 
specified date;
(b) A certificate of mailing issued by the United 
States Postal Service; or
(c) The endorsement of a sheriff, constable or other 
process server stating the time and manner of service.
4. If service of the notice was not delivered in 
person to a tenant whose rent is reserved by a period 
of 1 week or less and the tenancy has not continued 
for more than 45 days, proof of service must include:
(a) A certificate of mailing issued by the United 
States Postal Service or by a private postal service 
to the landlord or his agent; or
(b) The endorsement of a sheriff or constable 
stating the:
(1) Time and date the request for service was made 
by the landlord or his agent;
(2) Time, date and manner of the service; and
(3) Fees paid for the service.
[1911 CPA º 649; RL º 5591; NCL º 9138]--(NRS A 
1961, 413; 1967, 196; 1985, 231, 1418; 1987, 701; 
1995, 1854)

40.290 Parties defendant; persons bound by 
judgment. No person other than the tenant of 
the premises and the subtenant, if there be one, in 
actual occupation of the premises when the action is 
commenced, need be made parties defendant in the 
proceeding, nor shall any proceeding abate nor the 
plaintiff be nonsuited for the nonjoinder of any 
person who might have been made a party defendant; but 
when it appears that any of the parties served with 
process or appearing in the proceeding is guilty of 
the offense charged, judgment must be rendered against 
him. In case a person has become subtenant of the 
premises in controversy after the service of any 
notice in this chapter provided for, the fact that 
such notice was not served on such subtenant shall 
constitute no defense to the action. All persons who 
enter under the tenant, after the commencement of the 
action hereunder, shall be bound by the judgment the 
same as if they had been made parties to the action.
[1911 CPA º 650; RL º 5592; NCL º 9139]

NEVADA CASES.
Judgment upon confession 
cannot be entered. 
Judgment upon confession 
cannot be entered in justice's 
court in action for forcible 
entry and unlawful detainer. 
Paul v. Armstrong, 1 Nev. 82 
(1865)

Obligation of assignee 
of lease not excused, justified 
or avoided by obligation of 
assignor for rent. 
Assignor of lease was not 
indispensable party defendant in 
unlawful detainer action, 
because only tenant in 
possession and subtenant, if 
any, are so designated by NRS 
40.290 and, even though assignor 
may be obligated for rent as 
surety, obligation of assignee 
is not thereby excused, 
justified or avoided. Volpert v. 
Papagna, 83 Nev. 429, 433 P.2d 
533 (1967)


40.300 Contents of complaint; issuance and 
service of summons; temporary writ of restitution; 
notice, hearing and bond.
1. The plaintiff in his complaint, which shall be 
in writing, must set forth the facts on which he seeks 
to recover, and describe the premises with reasonable 
certainty and may set forth therein any circumstances 
of fraud, force or violence which may have accompanied 
the alleged forcible entry, or forcible or unlawful 
detainer, and claim damages therefor, or compensation 
for the occupation of the premises or both. In case 
the unlawful detainer charged be after default in the 
payment of rent, the complaint must state the amount 
of such rent.
2. The summons shall be issued and served as in 
other cases, but the court, judge or justice of the 
peace may shorten the time within which the defendant 
shall be required to appear and defend the action, in 
which case the officer or person serving the summons 
shall change the prescribed form thereof to conform to 
the time of service as ordered; but where publication 
is necessary the court shall direct publication for a 
period of not less than 1 week.
3. At any time after the filing of the complaint 
and issuance of summons, the court, upon application 
therefor, may issue a temporary writ of restitution; 
provided:
(a) That the temporary writ of restitution shall not 
issue ex parte but only after the issuance and service 
of an order to show cause why a temporary writ of 
restitution shall not be issued and after the 
defendant has been given an opportunity to oppose the 
issuance of the temporary writ of restitution.
(b) That the temporary writ of restitution shall not 
issue until the court has had an opportunity to 
ascertain the facts sufficiently to enable it to 
estimate the probable loss to the defendant and fix 
the amount of a bond to indemnify the party or parties 
against whom the temporary writ may be issued.
(c) That the temporary writ of restitution shall not 
issue until there has been filed with the approval of 
the court a good and sufficient bond of 
indemnification in the amount fixed by the court.
[1911 CPA º 651; A 1939, 171; 1951, 251]
REVISER'S NOTE.
See paragraph (b) of 
subsection 3. The 1951 amendment 
(Stats. 1951, p. 251) apparently 
was incomplete, reading: "to 
indemnify the party or parties 
against the temporary writ may 
be issued." The reviser added 
the word "whom," making the 
phrase read: "to indemnify the 
party or parties against whom 
the temporary writ may be 
issued."


NEVADA CASES.
Complaint which did not allege 
fraud insufficient to warrant 
arrest of defendant. Under 
secs. 1, 2 and 9, ch. 46, Stats. 
1865 (cf. NRS 40.220-40.252, 
40.254 and 40.300), relating to 
forcible entry and unlawful 
detainer, complaint which did 
not allege fraud on part of 
defendant, either in making such 
forcible entry or in holding 
such possession by force, was 
radically defective and wholly 
insufficient to warrant arrest 
of defendant under statute. 
Strozzi v. Wines, 24 Nev. 389, 
55 Pac. 828, 57 Pac. 832 (1899)

Provision for temporary 
writ of restitution intended to 
be summary. Provisions of 
NCL º 9132 et seq. (cf. NRS 
40.220 et seq.) governing 
actions of forcible entry and 
detainer are often summary in 
character, and provision of 1931 
NCL º 9140 (cf. NRS 40.300) for 
temporary writ of restitution 
"upon application" was likewise 
intended to be summary and did 
not contemplate notice of 
application. Farnow v. Eighth 
Judicial Dist. Court, 64 Nev. 
109, 178 P.2d 371 (1947), 
distinguished, Whitney v. Second 
Judicial Dist. Court, 68 Nev. 
176, at 180, 227 P.2d 960 (1951)

Application for 
temporary writ of restitution 
not a motion under court rule. 
In action of forcible 
entry and detainer under 1931 
NCL º 9140 (cf. NRS 40.300), 
which authorized issuance of 
temporary writ of restitution 
upon application, application 
was for writ and not for order, 
and application was not in 
reality motion under NCL º 8909 
(cf. N.R.C.P. 7(b)). Farnow v. 
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 64 
Nev. 109, 178 P.2d 371 (1947)


40.310 Issue of fact to be tried by jury if 
proper demand made. Whenever an issue of fact 
is presented by the pleadings, it shall be tried by a 
jury, if proper demand is made pursuant to the Nevada 
Rules of Civil Procedure or the Nevada Justices' 
Courts' Rules of Civil Procedure.
[1911 CPA º 652; RL º 5594; NCL º 9141]--(NRS A 
1975, 1203)

40.320 Proof required of plaintiff and 
defendant on trial.
1. On the trial of any proceeding for any forcible 
entry or forcible detainer, the plaintiff shall only 
be required to show, in addition to the forcible entry 
or forcible detainer complained of, that he was 
peaceably in the actual possession at the time of the 
forcible entry, or was entitled to possession at the 
time of the forcible detainer.
2. The defendant may show in his defense that he or 
his ancestors, or those whose interest in such 
premises he claims, have been in the quiet possession 
thereof for the space of 1 whole year together next 
before the commencement of the proceedings, and that 
his interest therein is not then ended or determined, 
and such showing is a bar to the proceedings.
[1911 CPA º 653; RL º 5595; NCL º 9142]

NEVADA CASES.
Plaintiff must allege and 
prove forcible entry and 
detention by defendant or 
forcibly held possession by 
defendant after peaceable entry. 
Under B º 50 (cf. NRS 
40.320), it is necessary to 
allege and prove, in action for 
forcible entry and detainer, 
that plaintiff was in actual, 
peaceable possession of premises 
and that defendant forcibly 
entered thereon and forcibly 
detained same, or that defendant 
forcibly held possession which 
plaintiff was entitled to enjoy, 
although entry was peaceable. 
Lachman v. Barnett, 18 Nev. 269, 
3 Pac. 38 (1884)


40.330 Amendment of complaint to conform to 
proof; continuance. When, upon the trial of any 
proceeding under NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive, it 
appears from the evidence that the defendant has been 
guilty of either a forcible entry or forcible or 
unlawful detainer, and other than the offense charged 
in the complaint, the judge must order that such 
complaint be forthwith amended to conform to such 
proofs. Such amendment must be without any imposition 
of terms. No continuance must be permitted upon 
account of such amendment, unless the defendant, by 
affidavit filed, shows to the satisfaction of the 
court good cause therefor.
[1911 CPA º 654; RL º 5596; NCL º 9143]

40.340 Adjournments. The court or 
justice of the peace may for good cause shown adjourn 
the trial of any cause under NRS 40.220 to 40.420, 
inclusive, not exceeding 5 days; and when the 
defendant, his agent or attorney, shall make oath that 
he cannot safely proceed to trial for want of some 
material witness, naming him, stating the evidence 
that he expects to obtain, showing that he has used 
due diligence to obtain such witness and believes that 
if an adjournment be allowed he will be able to 
procure the attendance of such witness, or his 
deposition, in time to produce the same upon the 
trial, in which case, if such person or persons will 
give bond, with one or more sufficient sureties, 
conditioned to pay the complainant for all rent that 
may accrue during the pending of such suit, and all 
costs and damages consequent upon such adjournment, 
the court or justice of the peace shall adjourn the 
cause for such reasonable time as may appear 
necessary, not exceeding 30 days.
[1911 CPA º 655; RL º 5597; NCL º 9144]

40.350 Trial not to be adjourned when 
complainant admits evidence in affidavit would be 
given. If the complainant admit that the 
evidence stated in the affidavit mentioned in NRS 
40.340 would be given by such witness, and agree that 
it be considered as actually given on the trial, or 
offered and overruled as improper, the trial shall not 
be adjourned.
[1911 CPA º 656; RL º 5598; NCL º 9145]

40.360 Judgment; damages; execution and 
enforcement.
1. Judgment. If, upon the trial, the verdict of 
the jury, or, if the case be tried without a jury, the 
finding of the court, be in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendant, judgment shall be entered for 
the restitution of the premises; and, if the 
proceeding be for unlawful detainer after neglect or 
failure to perform any condition or covenant of the 
lease or agreement under which the property is held, 
or after default in the payment of rent, the judgment 
shall also declare the forfeiture of such lease or 
agreement.
2. Damages. The jury or the court, if the 
proceeding be tried without a jury, shall also assess 
the damages occasioned to the plaintiff by any 
forcible entry, or by any forcible or unlawful 
detainer, and any amount found due the plaintiff by 
reason of waste of the premises by the defendant 
during the tenancy, alleged in the complaint and 
proved on the trial, and find the amount of any rent 
due, if the alleged unlawful detainer be after default 
in the payment of rent; and the judgment shall be 
rendered against the defendant guilty of the forcible 
entry, or forcible or unlawful detainer, for the rent 
and for three times the amount of the damages thus 
assessed.
3. Execution and enforcement. When the proceeding 
is for an unlawful detainer after default in the 
payment of the rent, and the lease or agreement under 
which the rent is payable has not by its terms 
expired, execution upon the judgment shall not be 
issued until the expiration of 5 days after the entry 
of the judgment, within which time the tenant, or any 
subtenant, or any mortgagee of the term, or other 
party interested in its continuance, may pay into 
court for the landlord the amount of the judgment and 
costs, and thereupon the judgment shall be satisfied 
and the tenant be restored to his estate; but, if 
payment, as herein provided, be not made within the 5 
days, the judgment may be enforced for its full amount 
and for the possession of the premises. In all other 
cases the judgment may be enforced immediately.
[1911 CPA º 657; RL º 5599; NCL º 9146]

NEVADA CASES.
Award of treble damages not 
authorized under former statute. 
Under secs. 648, 650 and 
651, ch. 103, Stats. 1861 (cf. 
NRS 40.360), court is not 
authorized to award judgment of 
treble damages against tenant 
holding over after failure by 
tenant to pay rent and demand by 
landlord to quit or pay rent. 
Hoopes v. Meyer, 1 Nev. 433 
(1865), cited, Regan v. King, 39 
Nev. 216, at 223, 156 Pac. 688 
(1916)

Rents not among damages 
which may be trebled. 
Rents are not among items 
of damage which may be trebled 
in action under RL º 5599 (cf. 
NRS 40.360) for rents and treble 
damages. Award of treble rents 
as damages to plaintiff by 
justice's court was not properly 
before appellate court on 
certiorari, but appellate court 
recommended that justice's court 
of its own motion or otherwise 
correct or set aside its 
judgment. Regan v. King, 39 Nev. 
216, 156 Pac. 688 (1916), cited, 
Farnow v. Las Vegas Aerie No. 
1213, F.O.E., 65 Nev. 80, at 
108, 188 P.2d 615 (1948), 
dissenting opinion.

Immediate forfeiture 
correct under terms of lease. 
In unlawful detainer 
action after default in rent 
payment where lease specifically 
provided for reentry and 
possession by lessor upon breach 
of condition, summary judgment 
declaring immediate forfeiture 
was correct under authority of 
NRS 40.360 without allowance for 
5-day redemption period, because 
lease by its terms had expired. 
Volpert v. Papagna, 83 Nev. 429, 
433 P.2d 533 (1967)

Requirement that notice 
be in alternative was 
jurisdictional and court could 
not enter judgment for rent in 
absence of judgment for 
restitution. In unlawful 
detainer action, where notice to 
quit did not demand payment of 
rent, either in alternative or 
at all, trial court did not err 
in failing to determine amount 
of rent owing, because 
requirement of NRS 40.2512 that 
notice be in alternative was 
jurisdictional, and, under NRS 
40.360, court could not enter 
judgment for rent in absence of 
judgment for restitution. Claim 
for rent was incident to 
unlawful detainer, and failed 
when main object of action 
failed. Gasser v. Jet Craft, 
Ltd., 87 Nev. 376, 487 P.2d 346 
(1971), cited, American Fence, 
Inc. v. Wham, 93 Nev. 26, at 27, 
559 P.2d 824 (1977), American 
Fence, Inc. v. Wham, 95 Nev. 
788, at 791, 603 P.2d 274 
(1979), Gibby's, Inc. v. Aylett, 
96 Nev. 678, at 681, 615 P.2d 
949 (1980)

Ordinary action for 
damages is appropriate remedy 
for breach of lease covenants 
where no unlawful detainer is 
found. Where lessors 
brought action for unlawful 
detainer but district court 
found evidence insufficient to 
warrant granting unlawful 
detainer and restitution of the 
property, district court was 
without jurisdiction to award 
sanctions for hardship caused by 
lessees' minor infractions of 
lease covenants (see NRS 
40.360). Appropriate remedy for 
breach of lease covenants when 
no unlawful detainer is found is 
ordinary civil action for 
damages. Gibby's, Inc. v. 
Aylett, 96 Nev. 678, 615 P.2d 
949 (1980)

Provision for treble 
damages did not apply to 
tenant's counterclaim for 
damages. In action brought 
by landlord against tenant for 
unlawful detainer, provision in 
NRS 40.360 for treble damages in 
cases of forcible or unlawful 
detainer did not apply to 
tenant's counterclaim for 
damages for "unlawful eviction" 
by landlord on ground that 
landlord had unlawfully changed 
locks. Where tenant sought 
damages only and did not seek 
restitution of premises, action 
was not detainer action. 
McKinnon v. Cantarutti-
Althuizen, 98 Nev. 72, 639 P.2d 
563 (1982)


40.370 Verification of complaint and 
answer. The complaint and answer must be 
verified.
[1911 CPA º 658; RL º 5600; NCL º 9147]

NEVADA CASES.
Process will be void if there 
is defect of proof as to 
essential point. Where 
statute requires certain facts 
to be proved to warrant issuing 
of process in court of special 
and limited jurisdiction, if 
there be defect of proof as to 
essential point, process will be 
void. Paul v. Armstrong, 1 Nev. 
82 (1865), cited, Phillips v. 
Snowden Placer Co., 40 Nev. 66, 
at 87, 160 Pac. 786 (1916)

Failure to verify 
complaint waived by filing 
answer. Failure to verify 
complaint in unlawful detainer 
action as required by NRS 40.370 
is waived by filing answer. 
Musso v. Triplett, 78 Nev. 355, 
372 P.2d 687 (1962)


40.380 Provisions governing appeals. 
Either party may, within 10 days, appeal from the 
judgment rendered. But an appeal by the defendant 
shall not stay the execution of the judgment, unless, 
within the 10 days, he shall execute and file with the 
court or justice his undertaking to the plaintiff, 
with two or more sureties, in an amount to be fixed by 
the court or justice, but which shall not be less than 
twice the amount of the judgment and costs, to the 
effect that, if the judgment appealed from be affirmed 
or the appeal be dismissed, the appellant will pay the 
judgment and the cost of appeal, the value of the use 
and occupation of the property, and damages justly 
accruing to the plaintiff during the pendency of the 
appeal. Upon taking the appeal and filing the 
undertaking, all further proceedings in the case shall 
be stayed.
[1911 CPA º 659; RL º 5601; NCL º 9148]

NEVADA CASES.
Where complaint did not show 
that landlord had given 
unequivocal notice, action was 
not clearly for unlawful 
detainer and statutory period 
for appeals generally applied. 
In action in justice's 
court for possession of premises 
held in month-to-month tenancy 
and for damages, where complaint 
did not show that landlord had 
given tenant unequivocal notice 
to quit pursuant to sec. 1, ch. 
27, Stats. 1917 (cf. NRS 
40.251), action was not clearly 
for unlawful detainer, and 
district court had jurisdiction 
to proceed with action where 
appeal was taken within 30-day 
statutory period generally 
allowed for appeals from 
justice's court, but not within 
10-day period provided by RL º 
5601 (cf. NRS 40.380) in 
unlawful detainer actions. 
Mandamus issued requiring 
district court to proceed. 
Roberts v. Second Judicial Dist. 
Court, 43 Nev. 332, 185 Pac. 
1067 (1920), cited, State ex 
rel. Weber v. McFadden, 46 Nev. 
1, at 7, 205 Pac. 594 (1922), 
distinguished, Beyer v. Second 
Judicial Dist. Court, 67 Nev. 
480, at 488, 221 P.2d 1024 
(1950)

Appeal from money 
judgment on cross-complaint not 
governed by former statute. 
On appeal from judgment 
for defendant in action of 
unlawful detainer, where 
defendant was awarded money 
judgment on cross-complaint, 
provisions of NCL º 9148 (cf. 
NRS 40.380) requiring appeal to 
be taken within 10 days applied 
to unlawful detainer aspects of 
action, but appeal from money 
judgment was governed by 
provisions of civil practice act 
allowing 6 months for appeal, 
because there were not same 
reasons for haste and summary 
action. West v. Edwards, 62 Nev. 
1, 134 P.2d 932 (1943), cited, 
Aikins v. Andrews, 91 Nev. 746, 
at 748, 542 P.2d 734 (1975), 
Gibby's, Inc. v. Aylett, 96 Nev. 
678, at 680, 615 P.2d 949 (1980)


40.390 Appellate court not to dismiss or 
quash proceedings for want of form. In all 
cases of appeal under NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive, 
the appellate court shall not dismiss or quash the 
proceedings for want of form, provided the proceedings 
have been conducted substantially according to the 
provisions of NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive; and 
amendments to the complaint, answer or summons, in 
matters of form only, may be allowed by the court at 
any time before final judgment upon such terms as may 
be just; and all matters of excuse, justification or 
avoidance of the allegations in the complaint may be 
given in evidence under the answer.
[1911 CPA º 660; RL º 5602; NCL º 9149]

NEVADA CASES.
Trial court required to 
determine whether affirmative 
defenses had been established 
before granting summary 
judgment. In unlawful 
detainer action where certain 
affirmative defenses were 
raised, trial court was required 
under NRS 40.390 to determine 
whether or not there had been 
established thereby excuse, 
justification or avoidance of 
obligation to pay rent before it 
could grant motion for summary 
judgment. Volpert v. Papagna, 83 
Nev. 429, 433 P.2d 533 (1967)

Notice to pay or quit 
which contained reservation of 
right to change amount of rent 
due was legally sufficient. 
In unlawful detainer 
action, where notice to pay or 
quit, which was required by NRS 
40.2512, contained reservation 
of right to change amount of 
rent shown as due, notice was 
legally sufficient because 
statute does not require 
specification of amount, and 
notice otherwise met substantial 
compliance test provided in NRS 
40.390. Volpert v. Papagna, 83 
Nev. 429, 433 P.2d 533 (1967), 
cited, Gasser v. Jet Craft, 
Ltd., 87 Nev. 376, at 380, 387 
P.2d 346 (1971)


40.400 Rules of practice. The 
provisions of NRS, Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure and 
Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure relative to civil 
actions, appeals and new trials, so far as they are 
not inconsistent with the provisions of NRS 40.220 to 
40.420, inclusive, apply to the proceedings mentioned 
in those sections.
[1911 CPA º 661; RL º 5603; NCL º 9150]
REVISER'S NOTE.
Reference to Nevada 
Rules of Civil Procedure was 
added. Reference to "Nevada 
Rules of Appellate Procedure" 
was added as result of adoption 
of appellate rules effective 
July 1, 1973.

NEVADA CASES.
Defendant should have been 
permitted to show relationship 
of parties as mortgagee and 
mortgagor. In action for 
restitution of real property for 
unlawful detainer, defendant 
should have been permitted to 
show that relationship of 
parties was mortgagee and 
mortgagor rather than having to 
bring separate equitable action 
to enjoin action for unlawful 
detainer, because Nev. Art. 6, º 
14, provides that law and equity 
may be administered in same 
action and RL º 5603 (cf. NRS 
40.400) provides that procedure 
in civil actions, so far as 
consistent, applies in actions 
for forcible entry and unlawful 
detainer. Yori v. Phenix, 38 
Nev. 277, 149 Pac. 180 (1915)


40.420 Form of writ of restitution; 
execution.
1. The writ of restitution issued by a justice of 
the peace must be substantially in the following form:

The State of Nevada to the sheriff or constable of the 
county of ................, greeting: Whereas, A.B., 
of the county of ................, at a court of 
inquiry of an unlawful holding over of (lands) 
(tenements) (a mobile home), and other possessions, 
held at my office (stating the place), in the county 
aforesaid, on the ........ day of .............., A.D. 
....., before me, a justice of the peace for the 
county aforesaid, by the consideration of the court, 
has recovered judgment against C.D., to have 
restitution of (here describe the premises as in the 
complaint). You are therefore commanded, that taking 
with you the force of the county, if necessary, you 
cause C.D. to be immediately removed from the 
premises, and A.B. to have peaceable restitution of 
the premises. You are also commanded that of the goods 
and chattels of C.D., within said county, which are 
not exempt from execution, you cause to be made the 
sum of ........ dollars for the plaintiff, together 
with the costs of suit endorsed hereon, and make 
return of this writ within 30 days after this date. 
Given under my hand, this ........ day of ........, 
A.D. ..... E.F., justice of the peace.

2. The sheriff or constable shall execute the writ 
in the same manner as required by the provisions of 
chapter 21 of NRS for writs of execution.
[1911 CPA º 663; RL º 5605; NCL º 9152]--(NRS A 
1969, 264; 1989, 1144)

NEVADA CASES.
Appellate court may order 
rerestitution. Where 
justice's court has entered 
summary judgment under unlawful 
detainer statute, appellate 
court, hearing case on 
certiorari, may order 
rerestitution. Paul v. 
Armstrong, 1 Nev. 82 (1865)


40.425 Notice of execution on writ of 
restitution.
1. Execution on the writ of restitution may occur 
only if the sheriff serves the judgment debtor with 
notice of the execution and a copy of the writ in the 
manner described in NRS 21.076. The notice must 
describe the types of property exempt from execution 
and explain the procedure for claiming those 
exemptions. The clerk of the court shall attach the 
notice to the writ at the time the writ is issued.
2. The notice required pursuant to subsection 1 
must be in the form and served in the manner provided 
for execution on judgments pursuant to NRS 21.075 and 
21.076.
(Added to NRS by 1989, 1144)